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When Bigger Is Better: A Critique 
of the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index’s Use to Evaluate Mergers 
in Network Industries 
 
Toby Roberts* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) operates under a 
very simple premise: industry behavior strongly correlates with 
industry structure; the larger a firm is within its industry, the 
more likely it is to engage in supracompetitive pricing or other 
anticompetitive conduct.1 For more than 30 years, antitrust 
regulators have used the index to gauge whether prospective 
mergers would produce a firm of such magnitude that it would 
adversely impact societal welfare. When an HHI analysis of an 
impending merger suggests that a potentially harmful increase 
in concentration will result, the companies involved must 
demonstrate that the merger has other characteristics that 
mitigate its impact on prices in order to gain regulatory 
approval.2 
 
* Staff attorney at the California Court of Appeal and former law 
clerk at the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit. The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the 
author and do not reflect those of any court or judge. The author 
wishes to thank Professor Daniel Rubinfeld for his extremely helpful 
comments on an early draft of this Article and Dr. George Radics for 
encouraging its publication. 
1. See generally Dennis C. Mueller, Lessons from the United 
States’s Antitrust History, 14 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 415 (1996) 
(discussing the history of economic analysis in antitrust and citing 
the wide body of literature correlating structure with behavior). This 
paper will focus solely on the consumer welfare effects from increases 
in post-merger price. 
2. For example, in many industries a post-merger firm will have 
lower unit costs due to economies of scale, which, in the absence of 
increased market power, tend to decrease prices. The Merger 
1
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One result of reliance on the HHI has been an erroneous 
conflation of market power (as proxied by market share) with 
consumer disutility. Although the close relationship between 
the two holds up in general, one significant exception arises in 
network industries. Network firms benefit consumers 
commensurately with their size. For example, given the choice 
between two equally priced credit cards, one accepted by 
merchants nationwide and the other by only half, most people 
would prefer to own the card with greater acceptance. Many 
people would willingly pay at least somewhat higher interest 
rates or greater fees for access to the larger network because 
the benefit of owning a universally accepted credit card 
outweighs the additional cost. But what if the larger network 
didn’t exist? What if only smaller credit card companies 
existed? And what if two of those smaller firms desired to 
merge but could not offer the government a compelling reason 
why they would not subsequently exercise their increased 
market power to raise prices? 
This Article argues that the current framework used by 
the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) to evaluate mergers is inadequate in that 
it fails to account for network benefits. In particular, I argue 
for abandoning the use of the HHI in analyzing network 
industry mergers because the index generates little useful 
information about these mergers’ effect on consumer welfare. 
Part II describes the HHI’s historical and theoretical 
underpinnings and its integration into the current Merger 
Guidelines. Part III considers general objections to the HHI 
before turning to its problems in evaluating network 
industries. Part IV presents a formal model for evaluating the 
effects of mergers in network industries. Part V proposes an 
alternative framework for merger analysis to account for 
network effects. Part VI concludes. 
 
 
 
 
 
Guidelines allow for such “efficiencies” to offset the anticompetitive 
concerns posed by large-scale consolidation. See infra Part II.B. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/8
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II. History of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
 
A. The Search for an Optimal Measure of Concentration 
 
1. Early Measures of Concentration: The Golden Age of  
   Graphs3 
 
Statistical indexes of industrial concentration grew out of 
attempts by economists and statisticians in the early twentieth 
century to measure income distribution and inequality.4 
Theorists agreed that a society in which all members enjoyed 
equal incomes exhibited no income concentration; likewise, a 
state of affairs in which all income accrued to just one person 
would constitute the highest concentration possible.5 The 
difficulty lay in developing a statistic that would meaningfully 
describe levels of inequality that fell between these antipodean 
states.6 
Initial efforts proved fruitless because the models exhibited 
sensitivity to absolute income levels, rendering them useless 
for international or intertemporal comparisons.7 In 1905, Max 
Otto Lorenz published a seminal paper on the subject of wealth 
 
3. See JUDY L. KLEIN, STATISTICAL VISIONS IN TIME: A HISTORY OF 
TIME SERIES ANALYSIS, 1662–1938 17 (1997) (describing the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as “the golden stage for 
graphs,” bridging periods of predominantly tabular and algebraic 
presentation of statistical data). 
4. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, NATIONAL POWER AND THE 
STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN TRADE 157 (1945). 
5. See Michael Schneider, Measuring Inequality: The Origins of 
the Lorenz Curve and the Gini Coefficient 6-8 (2000) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at 
http://www.latrobe.edu.au/data/assets/pdf_file/0011/130889/2004.01.p
df. 
6. See id. 
7. For instance, in 1895 Vilfredo Pareto observed a linear 
logarithmic relationship between income level, x, and the number of 
persons above a given income level, n: log n = log A – α log x (where A 
and α are constants). Pareto proposed using α as a measure of 
concentration. His model fell prey to criticism, which asserted not 
only that α was sensitive to absolute income levels irrespective of 
concentration, but that α was insensitive to changes in income by the 
highest earning individual or group. See id. at 6. 
3
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concentration.8 Lorenz proposed graphing the percent of 
individuals on the horizontal axis, arranged from poorest to 
richest, and their cumulative wealth on the vertical axis.9 By 
using percentages rather than absolute wealth levels, Lorenz 
avoided the pitfalls that had ensnared his contemporaries. 
The Lorenz curve, as the procedure became known, is 
illustrated in Figure 1(a) for two hypothetical countries. 
Country A has a more egalitarian wealth distribution than 
country B, given that curve A lies entirely above curve B, 
except at the endpoints. The straight line connecting the two 
endpoints—the equal distribution line—represents a situation 
of zero concentration.10 
 
Figure 1. 
 
  
 
 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
8. M.O. Lorenz, Methods of Measuring the Concentration of 
Wealth, 9 PUBL’NS AM. STAT. ASS’N 209 (1905). 
9. See id. at 216-19. Lorenz was inconsistent about which axis 
should depict “Percent of Number” and which should depict “Percent 
of Total Wealth.” Gini followed his textual description rather than his 
graphs, as do I. Compare id. at 217-18, with Corrado Gini, Sulla 
Misura della Concentrazione e della Variabilità dei Caratteri, 73 ATTI 
DEL REALE ISTITUTO VENETO DI SCIENZE, LETTERE ED ARTI 1203, 1229 
(1914). 
10. More formally, on the line of equal distribution, x percent of 
the population holds y = x percent of the wealth. 
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 The situation illustrated by Figure 1(b) presents 
ambiguity: both countries C and D exhibit some degree of 
inequality in wealth distribution, but the Lorenz curves do not 
clearly show which country has the greater concentration of 
wealth. At the point where the curves cross, the richer and 
poorer cohorts in country C hold, respectively, the same 
percentages of total assets as in country D. In country C, there 
is less variance in wealth among the poorer cohort of the 
population and more disparity among the richer cohort relative 
to country D. 
Italian statisticians, in particular Corrado Gini, devised a 
general method for comparing two or more Lorenz curves.11 
Gini had been working independently on a measure of 
inequality.12 The traditional statistical measure of inequality—
variance—focuses on the dispersion from a population’s 
arithmetic mean. Gini came to believe that, in certain social 
science contexts, the appropriate measure of inequality should 
consider not “how much [] diverse outlying quantities differ 
from their arithmetic mean[,]” but rather “how much [] diverse 
actual magnitudes differ [from] each other.”13 He proposed an 
index of inequality that measured the “mean difference” in a 
population, obtained by taking every possible pair of 
observations, recording the absolute difference in value for 
each pair, and computing the average difference across all of 
the pairs.14 
Gini demonstrated that the “mean difference” is equal to 
the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of equal 
distribution.15 This relationship allowed a comparison between 
any two Lorenz curves—whichever curve had the greater area 
between it and the line of equal distribution represented the 
greater degree of inequality. Gini’s coefficient of concentration, 
 
11. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 4, at 157-58 n.2. 
12. See Schneider, supra note 5, at 11, 15 n.16. 
13. Id. at 12 (citation omitted). 
14. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 4, at 157-58 n.2. In a population 
of n observations where each observation has a value of xi (i  1, 2, 
. . . , n), the mean difference is equal to: 
 
 (   )
∑ ∑            
   
   
   
   
 
15. See Gini, supra note 9, at 1229-33. 
5
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still in use today, took the area bounded by the Lorenz curve 
and line of equal distribution, and divided it by the entire 
triangular area underneath the line of equal distribution.16 
As a measure of concentration, the Lorenz-Gini measure 
works well when the resource under measurement is allocated 
over a sufficiently large number of observations, such as in the 
distribution of wealth or income across a society. As applied to 
industrial concentration, however, the Gini Index fails to 
provide crucial information about the number of firms in the 
industry. Figure 2 illustrates the problem. 
 
Figure 2. 
 
  
 
 
 
(a) 
 
 
 
(b) 
  
Figure 2(a) depicts the Lorenz curve for a five-firm 
industry with market shares of 5%, 10%, 15%, 30%, and 40%. 
The Gini coefficient for this industry is .36, which indicates a 
moderate amount of concentration. Suppose that the firm with 
a 30% market share acquires the firms with 5% and 15% 
 
16. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 4, at 157-58 n.2. If the Lorenz 
curve is obtained by sampling from the population, then this estimate 
of the Gini coefficient is biased, necessitating a multiplier of n/(n – 1). 
In many industrial organization contexts, no such correction is 
needed because the Lorenz curve is calculated from a complete 
population. 
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shares, while the firm with a 40% share merges with the 
remaining firm, such that a two-firm industry emerges in 
which each company enjoys a 50% market share. Figure 2(b) 
depicts the post-merger Lorenz curve. The Gini coefficient for 
the duopoly is 0, paradoxically indicating less concentration 
than before the consolidation. This is because the Gini Index 
measures only disparity in market share without regard to the 
absolute size of any firm’s share. The Lorenz curve in figure 
2(b) would look the same no matter how many firms were in 
the industry provided that each had an equal market share. 
 
2. Other Attempts at Measuring Market Power 
 
a. Concentration Ratios 
 
 One persistent yet unilluminating tool for measuring 
industry concentration is the concentration ratio.17 It sums the 
market shares of the largest x firms in an industry, where x is 
typically 2, 4, or 8. This measure has been used since the time 
of the New Deal programs, when large volumes of industry 
statistics became increasingly available.18 The concentration 
ratio provides little information about an industry’s actual 
structure—it does not even amount to a point on a Lorenz 
curve.19 Furthermore, a concentration ratio reveals nothing 
about the inequality among either the top x firms or the bottom 
 
17. For general criticisms of concentration ratios, see, e.g., 
Michael O. Finkelstein & Richard M. Friedberg, The Application of 
an Entropy Theory of Concentration to the Clayton Act, 76 YALE L.J. 
677, 679-83 (1967). 
18. See, e.g., TEMP. NAT’L ECON. COMM., INVESTIGATION OF 
CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER, 76TH CONG., 274-75 (Comm. 
Print 1941), available at 
https://archive.org/details/investigationofc27unit. The authors offer 
no justification for either their use of a concentration ratio or their 
choice of four rather than some other number of firms. 
19. Without knowledge of how many firms comprise an industry, 
a concentration ratio provides only enough information to place a 
point on the vertical axis of a Lorenz curve; the point could fall 
anywhere to the right of the line of equal concentration, depending on 
the total number of firms. See Orris Clemens Herfindahl, 
Concentration in the Steel Industry 8-9 (1950) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with the Columbia 
University Library). 
7
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n – x firms. For instance, an eight-firm industry dominated by 
one firm with a 65% market share followed by seven firms each 
with 5% market shares presumably would behave very 
differently than an industry in which the top four firms each 
had shares of 20% and the next four largest firms had shares of 
5%. Yet the four-firm concentration ratio (CR-4) for both 
industries is the same—80%. 
Concentration ratios have long held sway with courts in 
determining the competitive impact of mergers,20 particularly 
after the DOJ formally adopted the four-firm concentration 
ratio in its initial 1968 Merger Guidelines.21 The subsequent 
1982 Guidelines ended the formal use of concentration ratios in 
favor of the HHI, and courts followed suit.22 Although no longer 
part of the formal DOJ and FTC merger review process, 
concentration ratios nonetheless continue to appear in opinions 
considering Sherman and Clayton Act claims.23 
 
b. Lerner Index 
 
Economists predicated their search for a measure of 
industrial concentration on the assumption that an industry’s 
structure influenced the conduct of its component firms—
 
20. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 
(1974) (discussing the Clayton Act); United States v. Von’s Grocery 
Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (discussing the Clayton Act); United States 
v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (discussing the Clayton and 
Sherman Acts). 
21. 1968 Merger Guidelines, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11247.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 
2014) [hereinafter 1968 Merger Guidelines]. 
22. See FTC v. PPG Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 
1986) (“The FTC and the Department of Justice, as well as most 
economists, consider the [HHI] measure superior to such cruder 
measures as the four- or eight-firm concentration ratios which merely 
sum up the market shares of the largest four or eight firms . . . . This 
method, unlike the four- and eight-firm concentration ratios, shows 
higher market power as the disparity in size between firms increases 
and as the number of firms outside the first four or eight decreases.”). 
23. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 
551 U.S. 877, 922-23 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Todd v. Exxon 
Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 208-09 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Manitowoc Co., No. 02-1509, 2002 WL 32060288, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 
11, 2002); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 199 F. 
Supp. 2d 362, 367 (M.D.N.C. 2002). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/8
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conduct which in turn affected the degree of market power that 
individual firms enjoyed.24 This aptly named structure-conduct-
performance (“SCP”) paradigm continues to enjoy cachet with 
both economists and courts.25 Under the SCP framework, the 
purpose of a concentration measure is to provide as accurate a 
proxy as possible for the actual degree of monopoly power 
exhibited by firms. 
The economist Abba Lerner questioned the need for such 
theoretical abstractions, proposing a more direct measure of 
monopoly power.26 The Lerner Index (L), as his formula has 
become known, is a straightforward measurement of a firm’s 
profits: 
  
   
 
 
where L is the index coefficient, p is the price at which a firm 
sells a particular good, and c is the firm’s marginal cost of 
producing the good. The Lerner Index thus avoids the 
difficulties inherent in choosing the relevant group of firms and 
products that comprise a given industry or market. Instead, it 
directly assesses the ability of a particular firm to charge a 
supracompetitive price for a particular product.27 
Despite its theoretical attractiveness, the Lerner Index has 
garnered substantial criticism primarily leveled at its viability 
as a practical tool. Measurements of marginal cost are rarely, if 
ever, straightforward.28 Small changes in the methodological 
 
24. See Richard Gilbert & Oliver Williamson, Antitrust Policy, in 
1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 82 
(Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
25. See, e.g., In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., No. 04-1616-JWL, 
2012 WL 6681783, at *3 (D. Kan. Dec. 21, 2012) (“[S]tructure-
conduct-performance analysis by an economist is well-accepted in 
[antitrust economics].”); TC Sys. Inc. v. Town of Colonie, 213 F. Supp. 
2d 171, 183 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (recognizing that “the S-C-P paradigm 
‘enjoys a long history and wide acceptance in the economic literature 
and in the antitrust courts’”). 
26. See generally A.P. Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the 
Measurement of Monopoly Power, 1 REV. ECON. STUD. 157 (1934). 
27. This follows from the classical economic assumption that in a 
perfectly competitive industry firms choose to produce an output level 
at which the market-bearing price equals their marginal cost. See, 
e.g., ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 
267 (6th ed. 2005). 
28. The American Airlines predatory pricing case illustrates the 
9
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assumptions for calculating marginal cost can lead to wildly 
divergent estimates of monopolistic profits.29 Moreover, short-
term demand shocks will change prices and, with them, the 
value of L, despite there being no underlying shift in a firm’s 
market power.30 
Even where accurate marginal cost calculations are 
possible, the Lerner Index often fails to reflect the competitive 
realities of a market. In a highly competitive industry where 
each firm faces a high, one-time sunk cost, the firms will need 
to recoup that cost, leading to prices above the industry-wide 
marginal cost. The Lerner Index would then falsely indicate 
the presence of some monopoly power.31 Conversely, a firm 
with relatively high marginal costs may engage in predatory 
behavior and other tactics in order to preclude a potential rival 
with lower marginal costs from entering the market. By 
focusing on the incumbent firm rather than the more efficient 
potential entrant, the Lerner Index would paint a more 
sanguine picture of the competitive conditions than actually 
warranted.32 Because the Lerner Index presents formidable 
 
difficulties involved in calculating marginal costs. See United States 
v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003). In 1999, the 
Government brought suit against American under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, alleging that American had responded illegally to new 
entrants in various markets involving its Dallas hub. Id. at 1111-13. 
In each case, American had expanded capacity, matched its rivals’ 
low fares, and made those fares readily available. Id. 
Notwithstanding the significant drop in average fares in the relevant 
markets, the district court held for the airline and the Tenth Circuit 
affirmed, noting that “marginal cost, an economic abstraction, is 
notoriously difficult to measure and ‘cannot be determined from 
conventional accounting methods.’” Id. at 1116 (citations omitted). 
The courts rejected all four measures of incremental costs proposed 
by the government, finding it undisputed that American had priced 
above average variable costs, a proxy for marginal costs. Id. at 1120. 
29. See LYNNE PEPALL ET AL., INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: 
CONTEMPORARY THEORY & PRACTICE 55 (3d ed. 2005); see also Ian 
Domowitz et al., Market Structure and Cyclical Fluctuations in U.S. 
Manufacturing, 70 REV. ECON. & STAT. 55 (1988); Robert E. Hall, The 
Relation Between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry, 96 J. 
POL. ECON. 921 (1988). 
30. See IIB PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 505 (3d 
ed. 2007). 
31. See PEPALL ET AL., supra note 29, at 54. 
32. HERBERT J. HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/8
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practical difficulties, it has remained a theoretical construct 
not often used as a regulatory tool.33 
 
3. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Solution 
 
Albert Hirschman recognized the limitations of using the 
Lorenz-Gini methodology in an industrial organization context. 
In the appendix to his 1945 book on international trade, 
Hirschman pointed out the need for a measure of concentration 
that took into account not only equality of market shares, but 
also the number of total competitors: 
 
[T]he number of elements in a series the 
concentration of which is being measured is an 
important consideration. This is so whenever 
concentration means “control by the few,” i.e., 
particularly in connection with market 
phenomena. . . One of the well-known conditions 
of perfect competition is that no individual seller 
should command an important share of the total 
market supply; this condition implies the 
presence of both relative equality of distribution 
and of large numbers.34 
 
To this end, Hirschman argued that any index purporting 
to measure industrial concentration should increase as the 
dispersion in market shares increases and decrease as the 
number of firms increases.35 
Hirschman proposed the following concentration index: 
√∑(
  
 
    )
 
 
   
 
where n is the number of firms, qj is the output (or sales, 
profits, etc.) of the jth firm, and Q is the industry’s total 
 
LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 245-46 (3d ed. 1994). 
33. See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 30, at ¶ 504. 
34. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 4, at 158. 
35. Id. at 160. 
11
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output.36 Hirschman demonstrated that his index could be 
expressed equivalently as 
   √
    
 
 
where v is the coefficient of variation, equal to    , or the 
standard deviation of the series divided by its arithmetic 
mean.37 
By breaking down the index into two components—one 
dependent on number of firms, n, and one dependent on the 
relative inequality of market shares, v—Hirschman fulfilled his 
self-imposed criteria. The index grows smaller as n increases 
and larger as v increases. 
Five years later, Orris Herfindahl independently reached a 
very similar solution to the inadequacies of the Lorenz curve in 
measuring industrial concentration.38 Examining concentration 
in the steel industry for his PhD dissertation, he proposed the 
familiar index: 
∑   
  
   
(∑   
 
   )
  
which is functionally equivalent to Hirschman’s index except 
for the square root sign and the scale.39 As did Hirschman, 
Herfindahl noted that his index could be expressed as a 
relationship between the number of firms and the coefficient of 
variation.40 Herfindahl surpassed Hirschman, however, in both 
 
36. Id. at 159. 
37. Id. The number 100 in the formulas merely allows the index 
to be expressed on a scale between 0 and 100; otherwise it would fall 
on the interval [0, 1]. Legal applications, following the practice in the 
Merger Guidelines, typically express the HHI on a scale of 0 to 
10,000. Hirschman offers no reason for his use of the square root sign 
in the formulas. 
38. See generally Herfindahl, supra note 19. Herfindahl, 
apparently unaware of Hirschman’s earlier work at the time he began 
writing, acknowledges it in a footnote but adds that Hirschman “did 
not view the index as a weighted average nor give a graphic 
representation.” Id. at 21 n.1. 
39. See id. at 19. Hirschman offered no reason for his use of the 
square root sign. He may have simply applied it to his formula for the 
sake of balance. 
40. See id. at 20. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/8
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his recognition of the legal applications and his conception of 
how to apply the index in such a context. 
 
[A]nti-trust law is assigning the size structure of 
firms a greater importance than formerly. 
Something less than one hundred per cent 
control of an industry is sufficient to make a 
showing of monopoly under the Sherman Act 
even in the absence of traditional acts in 
restraint of trade. The law will undoubtedly 
continue to use summary ideas resting on the 
size structure of firms. The economist will 
perform an important service if he can develop a 
more adequate account of the relationships 
between measures of concentration and market 
behavior.41 
 
While acknowledging the imprecision with which any 
structural index indicated monopoly performance, Herfindahl 
suggested that his index might aid antitrust policy as a cost-
efficient means of detection.42 Presciently, he remarked that a 
strict reliance on his index would incur costs “through the 
harassment of some industries whose performance is actually 
quite competitive but whose structure, by the conventional 
standards, is not.”43 
Indeed, Herfindahl felt that any index of concentration had 
only a limited usefulness, as it would comprise only “one, or at 
most a few, of the many variables that determine the degree of 
monopoly in an industry.”44 In addition to the number of firms 
and the inequality of their market shares, he suggested several 
other factors that influence an industry’s performance, such as 
the individual firms’ “locational distribution,” the “psychology” 
of corporate officers, and varying degrees of product 
substitutability.45 Because structural indices have at best a 
limited correlation with industry performance, Herfindahl felt 
 
41. Id. at 3 (footnote omitted). 
42. See id. at 171. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 3. 
45. Id. at 19, 170. 
13
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that his index should serve as just one tool among many in the 
application of antitrust policy.46 
 
4. Towards an HHI Standard 
 
Following the completion of Herfindahl’s thesis, the HHI 
began to gain acceptance among industrial organization 
economists, in no small part due to the influence of 
Herfindahl’s doctoral advisor, George Stigler.47 The HHI had 
many attractive features for an index of concentration, both 
practical and theoretical. 
One problem that plagued early forays into the study of 
industry structure was the lack of complete data and the lack 
of computing power to analyze the information available. The 
HHI advantageously required no complicated mathematical 
algorithms in its computation—merely addition and 
multiplication. 
In the decades before the information age, many 
economists voiced concern that information about industry 
structure often only encompassed the largest firms in the 
industry, potentially omitting many if not most market 
participants.48 This problem explains the popularity of the 
concentration ratio indexes despite their theoretical 
shortcomings. In theory, the HHI necessitated knowledge of 
every firm’s market share, yet in practice one could often 
generate a very precise HHI approximation using only a few 
firms.49 Moreover, to calculate the change in the index that a 
potential merger would produce, as is the current practice, it is 
necessary to know only the market shares of the two firms 
involved.50 
 
46. See id. at 169-72. 
47. See Stephen Calkins, The New Merger Guidelines and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 402, 409 (1983). 
48. See, e.g., Duncan Bailey & Stanley E. Boyle, The Optimal 
Measure of Concentration, 66 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 702, 703 (1971) 
(observing the prevailing assumption “that ‘better’ indexes could be 
developed if more detailed firm data were available”). 
49. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 4, at 160-62. 
50. If two merging firms have market shares x1 and x2, then the 
change in HHI is equivalent to 2x1x2. See 1997 Merger Guidelines, 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC 14 n. 8, 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/8
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The index also allowed for an easy practical interpretation. 
Taking the inverse of the HHI yields the number of “effective 
competitors,” or the number of equal-sized firms that would 
produce an equivalent HHI score.51 The DOJ used this 
interpretation when it introduced the HHI in 1982.52 
In addition, Herfindahl’s index has an attractive 
theoretical link to the Lerner Index via a Cournot oligopoly 
model.53 The economist Augustin Cournot, utilizing a 
framework that anticipated game theory by more than 100 
years, demonstrated that two firms competing on output and 
letting the market forces determine the price would wind up 
selling at a price between that of a monopolist and that in a 
perfectly competitive market.54 An extension of the Cournot 
duopoly model to include any number of firms reveals that as 
the number of firms decreases, the equilibrium price increases, 
the Lerner Index increases, and the HHI increases.55 As the 
number of firms tends toward infinity, the equilibrium price 
 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11251.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 
2014) [hereinafter 1997 Merger Guidelines]. 
51. See M.A. Adelman, Comment on the “H” Concentration 
Measure as a Numbers-Equivalent, 51 REV. ECON. & STAT. 99, 101 
(1969). For an example of the use of the phrase “effective competitors” 
in this context, see Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston, The 
Dynamics of Airline Pricing and Competition, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 389, 
390 (1990). But see George Eads, Intercity Passenger Transportation: 
Airline Capacity Limitation Controls: Public Vice or Public Virtue? 64 
AM. ECON. REV. 365, 367 (1974) (using “effective competitors” to 
denote those firms with a market share of greater than 10%). 
52. See 1982 Merger Guidelines, DEP’T OF JUSTICE 1, 14, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11248.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 
2012) [hereinafter 1982 Merger Guidelines] (explaining that markets 
with an HHI above 1,800 “hav[e] the equivalent of no more than 
approximately six equally sized firms”). 
53. See TROUT RADER, A THEORY OF MICROECONOMICS 271-76 
(1972); Robert E. Dansby & Robert D. Willig, Industry Performance 
Gradient Indexes, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 249 (1979). 
54. See AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE 
MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH 79-89 
(Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., 1897) (1838). 
55. Cournot made this extension. For a modern exposition, see 
PEPALL ET AL., supra note 29, at 215-23. Formally, the relationship is 
   
   ̅
 
  
HHI
 
 
where  ̅ is the weighted average industry marginal cost and   is the 
price elasticity of demand. 
15
  
2014] WHEN BIGGER IS BETTER 909 
approaches the perfectly competitive level, and the Lerner and 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Indexes approach zero.56 
Of course, the Cournot model is not itself without 
detractors—one important early critic pointed out that many 
firms compete on price rather than output.57 Nonetheless, it 
remains a workhorse in the field of industrial organization 
because it explains, using a very simple model of firm behavior, 
why a decreasing number of firms tends to result in an 
increasing ability to coordinate output and pricing, even in the 
absence of tacit collusion. Thus, the Herfindahl-Cournot-Lerner 
models provide a theoretical justification for the structure-
conduct-performance paradigm. 
 
B. The Merger Guidelines 
 
In the same year that Herfindahl submitted his doctoral 
dissertation, Congress passed the Celler-Kefauver Act,58 which 
broadened the government’s power to challenge mergers and 
marked the beginning of modern merger law.59 The DOJ and 
FTC originally derived their power to review and approve 
mergers from Section 7 of the Clayton Act,60 and Federal Trade 
Commission Act,61 respectively.62 The Celler-Kefauver Act, 
 
56. See id. 
57. See Joseph Bertrand, Review of Theorie Mathematique de la 
Richesse Sociale and of Recherches sur les Principles Mathematiques 
de la Theorie des Richesses, 68 J. DES SAVANTS 499 (1883). 
58. Pub. L. No. 899, 64 Stat. 1125 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 
(2012)). 
59. See William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger 
Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of 
Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 210-12 (2003). The first 
major case to apply the Celler-Kefauver legislation and provide an 
interpretation of its impact on merger regulation was Brown Shoe Co. 
v United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
60. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
61. Id. § 45. The Act precludes the FTC from evaluating bank and 
airline mergers. See id. § 45(a)(2). 
62. Most actions to enjoin mergers invoke the Clayton Act. The 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2, also grants the federal government 
power to stop mergers “in restraint of trade” or those that monopolize 
or attempt to monopolize a market. See Constance K. Robinson, 
Mergers and Acquisitions, in 1 CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/8
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enacted at a time of great concern over “a rising tide of 
economic concentration in the American economy,” gave teeth 
to the existing antitrust legislation by closing a number of 
loopholes and granting the government the power to curb any 
potential lessening of competition at its outset.63 
In 1968 the DOJ issued, for the first time, a set of 
guidelines explaining its approach to merger evaluation.64 This 
document had two notable features: a focus on market 
structure and the use of the four-firm concentration ratio as a 
measurement tool.65 
By concentrating its merger analysis on a few structural 
factors, the DOJ argued that it would “produce economic 
predictions that are fully adequate for the purposes of [the 
Clayton Act].”66 Additionally, its approach promoted efficient 
decision-making and provided transparency to industry 
participants.67 The DOJ thus adopted the prevailing belief by 
economists that industry performance cannot be measured in 
any consistent or accurate way, and that industry structure 
serves as a useful proxy. 
The DOJ accorded “primary significance” to market shares 
in assessing market structure for horizontal merger 
evaluations.68 For fourteen years, this meant using the CR-4.69 
Industries received a classification of either “Highly 
Concentrated”—those with a CR-4 of 75% or more—and “Less 
Highly Concentrated”—those with a CR-4 of less than 75%.70 
Concentration ratios do not convey sufficient information for a 
 
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES: 45TH ANNUAL ANTITRUST LAW INSTITUTE 
297, 303 (2004). 
63. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 315-20. 
64. The Guidelines limit discussion to merger analysis under the 
Clayton Act only. 1968 Merger Guidelines, supra note 21, at 1. 
65. See id. at 1-2, 14-15. 
66. Id. at 1-2. 
67. See id. 
68. See id. at 5. 
69. See id. at 6. 
70. Id. at 6. 
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mapping to a unique HHI score; an industry with a CR-4 of x% 
could reflect an HHI value between (
 
 
)
 
 and   .71 
The 1968 Guidelines state that the DOJ will “ordinarily 
challenge” mergers in highly concentrated markets where firms 
of certain enumerated sizes acquire other firms of certain 
enumerated sizes.72 In roughly equivalent terms, mergers 
inducing a change in HHI of more than 30 points would trigger 
a challenge.73 For less highly concentrated markets, mergers 
resulting in an HHI increase of 50 or more would trigger a 
challenge.74 
In 1982 the DOJ promulgated a new set of merger 
guidelines, in which the HHI replaced the four-firm 
concentration ratio as the method of measuring industry 
structure.75 The DOJ’s decision to embrace the HHI was 
remarkable given that courts had mostly rejected or ignored 
it.76 The change in methodology among DOJ lawyers reflected 
an implicit acceptance of the criticisms of the CR-4 and was 
also influenced substantially by the work of Herfindahl’s 
mentor, George Stigler.77 The HHI had appeared in the legal 
 
71. For a given concentration ratio, the lowest possible HHI 
would occur in an industry with four equal-sized firms and a virtually 
infinite number of other firms, each with a market share of close to 
zero. The HHI’s upper bound for the same concentration ratio would 
reflect an industry consisting of one firm with a 75% market share 
and a virtually infinite number of other firms, each with a market 
share of close to zero. 
72. 1968 Merger Guidelines, supra note 21, at 6. 
73. The Guidelines offer three examples: a firm of 4% market 
share acquiring another firm of 4% or more; a firm of 10% acquiring a 
firm of 2% or more; and a firm of 15% or more acquiring a firm of 1% 
or more. These scenarios represent, respectively, minimum HHI 
increases of 32, 40, and 30. 
74. For example, a firm with a 5% market share acquiring 
another firm of 5% or more (increasing HHI by 50 or more) would 
ordinarily receive a challenge, as would a firm with a 15% market 
share acquiring a firm of 3% or more (increasing HHI by 90 or more). 
See 1968 Merger Guidelines, supra note 21, at 6. 
75. See 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 52, at 11-15. 
76. Prior to the 1982 Guidelines, only six judicial opinions had 
mentioned the HHI. See Calkins, supra note 47, at 410. 
77. See David Scheffman et al., Twenty Years of Merger 
Guidelines Enforcement at the FTC: An Economic Perspective, 71 
ANTITRUST L.J. 277, 283 (2003) (“The appeal of the HHI was that it 
was related to Stigler’s ‘Theory of Oligopoly,’ which was the 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/8
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literature as early as 1969, when Richard Posner endorsed it, 
and Areeda and Turner later gave it their approval, “albeit 
without enthusiasm.”78 The FTC did not formally adopt the 
DOJ guidelines until 1992, when the two issued a set of joint 
guidelines, but it effectively endorsed the DOJ framework from 
1982 onwards.79 
The DOJ issued further versions of the Merger Guidelines 
in 1984, 1992, 1997, and 2010. Although the wording varied 
somewhat, the essential use of HHI in structural analysis 
remained substantially the same.80 Classification of industrial 
concentration levels expanded from two to three regions: 
“highly concentrated” (HHI above 2,500), “moderately 
concentrated” (HHI between 1,500 and 2,500), and 
“unconcentrated” (HHI below 1,500).81 More subtly, policy 
shifted from an examination of pre-merger market shares—
used in determining the CR-4—to an analysis of post-merger 
shares. 
The structural analysis thus considered the change in 
industry HHI rather than making a static examination of the 
merging firms’ market shares (although the two are directly 
related).82 By focusing on the change in the index values, the 
Merger Guidelines adhere to Herfindahl’s own beliefs about the 
use of his index in that they use it comparatively rather than 
 
foundation of the Guidelines’ collusion analysis (now known as 
coordinated interaction).”). 
78. Calkins, supra note 47, at 409-10. 
79. See Scheffman et al., supra note 77, at 284. 
80. A proviso barring the leading firm in an industry from 
merging with a firm of 1% market share or more was dropped in the 
1992 Guidelines. The subsequent guidelines did have several 
substantive changes in other respects, in particular relating to the 
use of efficiency as a defense of otherwise anticompetitive mergers. 
See id.; Kolasky & Dick, supra note 59. 
81. See 2010 Merger Guidelines, DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2014) [hereinafter 2010 Merger Guidelines]. The 2010 
revisions to the Guidelines increased the region thresholds 
substantially. Previously, markets were highly concentrated if the 
HHI level was greater than 1,800 and moderately concentrated 
between 1,000 and 1,800. See 1997 Merger Guidelines, supra note 50, 
at 14-15. 
82. See 1997 Merger Guidelines, supra note 50. 
19
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focusing on absolute HHI levels.83 The Guidelines recognize 
that, all else equal, the more concentrated an industry is, the 
more likely a given change in HHI will raise competitive 
concerns. Nonetheless, the Guidelines do not set any maximum 
HHI beyond which all mergers are presumptively 
anticompetitive, as illustrated in Figure 3. Transactions 
resulting in a moderately concentrated industry post-merger 
“potentially raise significant competitive concerns and often 
warrant scrutiny” if the HHI increases by more than 100 
points.84 Those resulting in a highly concentrated post-merger 
industry are treated similarly if the HHI increases between 
100–200 points and are “presumed to be likely to enhance 
market power” if the HHI increases by more than 200 points.85 
 
Figure 3.  
 
 
To the extent one can make a meaningful comparison 
between the CR-4 system of the 1968 Guidelines and the HHI 
scheme introduced in 1982, the threshold levels for regulatory 
scrutiny are not wildly divergent.86 For its part, the DOJ 
 
83. See Herfindahl, supra note 19, at 21-22 (“The usefulness of 
the measure lies in providing a definite description of gross changes 
and in furnishing a focus for further judgments about the data.”). 
84. See 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 81, at 19. 
85. See id. 
86. The 1982 Guidelines state that “the critical HHI thresholds 
at 1000 and 1800 correspond roughly to four-firm concentration ratios 
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believed that the market share thresholds for merging firms 
were comparable between the two sets of guidelines.87 In 
contrast, the DOJ anticipated that its new thresholds for 
industry concentration would be received as an overly 
permissive departure from the 1968 Guidelines and thus chose 
the original safe-harbor threshold of 1,000 “as much as a 
political anchorage to windward as because anyone thought 
that nicely round number was just right.”88 
In practice, the government has not strictly adhered to the 
numerical thresholds. The 1982 Merger Guidelines themselves 
concede that “[o]ther things being equal, cases falling just 
above and just below a threshold present comparable 
competitive concerns.”89 An internal FTC study found that 
during the 1980s the minimum level of HHI leading to merger 
objections generally exceeded 1800 by a few hundred points.90 
While this evidence might indicate a decreased reliance on 
HHI,91 it is equally consistent with higher unofficial HHI 
thresholds as part of the Reagan administration’s generally 
laissez-faire economic policies. 
 
III. Criticisms of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
 
Two primary factors justify the use of the HHI in merger 
evaluation. Sound economic theory links market structure, as 
measured by the HHI, to market power, and by extension, 
market performance. More practically, the Guidelines’ use of 
the HHI provides an objective benchmark that mitigates the 
ebb and flow of political and academic favor towards antitrust 
 
of 50 percent and 70 percent, respectively.” 1982 Merger Guidelines, 
supra note 52, at 11-15. 
87. See William F. Baxter, Antitrust Policy, in AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1980S 610 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1994). 
88. Id. 
89. 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 52, at 13. But the 
Guidelines justify deviations from their bright-line rules by noting 
“the numerical divisions suggest greater precision than is possible 
with the available economic tools and information,” suggesting that in 
the future more precision will be possible. Id. 
90. See Scheffman et al., supra note 77, at 300. 
91. See id. 
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policy.92 Nonetheless, several criticisms lie against the HHI, 
both in general and in particular, with regard to its use in 
network industry mergers. 
 
A. Criticisms Applicable to All Markets 
 
Herfindahl himself admitted that his index suffered the 
deficiency of considering only two indicia of industry 
behavior—the number of firms and the variance in market 
share distribution.93 He recognized that other factors would 
also play a role, in particular geographic dispersion of firms.94 
The Merger Guidelines cleverly handle this issue by dividing 
the inquiry into two steps: first market definition, then 
concentration analysis. Because the relevant market inquiry 
considers both geography and demand cross-elasticities,95 the 
HHI implicitly includes those factors. 
Other criticisms of the HHI broadly fall into two areas. 
The first attack its use in practice, either through faulty or 
inconsistent application or because of inappropriate 
calibration. The second line of criticism focuses on the Index’s 
theoretical underpinnings, arguing that it fails on a more 
fundamental level. 
 
1. Criticisms of the HHI in Practice 
 
The Guidelines’ use of the HHI has garnered criticism for 
its arbitrary numerical thresholds.96 Former Assistant 
Attorney General William Baxter, who was primarily 
responsible for the 1982 Guidelines, admitted as much, 
conceding the “arbitrary” lines “have no magical qualities” 
 
92. But for criticism of both the theoretical and practical 
justifications, see Robert D. Joffe et al., Proposed Revisions of the 
Justice Department’s Merger Guidelines, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1543 
(1981). 
93. See Herfindahl, supra note 19, at 19. 
94. See id. 
95. The Merger Guidelines specifically address geographic 
markets and implicitly address demand cross-elasticities in their 
SSNIP test. See 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 81, at 8-14. 
96. See, e.g., Jay Greenfield, Beyond Herfindahl: Non-Structural 
Elements of Merger Analysis, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 229 (1984). 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/8
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beyond “the fact that we were born with ten fingers and have 
gotten used to a base ten system.”97 However, this critique does 
not really address the adequacy of the HHI per se, but merely 
the details of its implementation. 
A related argument posits that the precision and 
sophistication of the HHI may cloak its limitations and create a 
false impression of scientific accuracy in the courts.98 
Exacerbating this problem, the argument continues, the 
government’s discretion in market definition renders any 
apparent concreteness in concentration thresholds illusory.99 
Yet, it seems doubtful that judges intelligent enough to parse 
the results of the CR-4 with skepticism would be duped into 
blind acceptance of the government’s case solely on HHI 
evidence. Moreover, any measure of concentration would fall 
prey to this criticism of misleading accuracy; surely it is better 
to have some objective standard in merger evaluation in the 
interests of fairness and consistency. 
Another criticism of the HHI highlights its potential to 
lead to wide measurement errors. As Hirschman noted, 
measurement errors of smaller firms’ market shares (perhaps 
from incomplete data) lead to relatively minor fluctuations in 
an industry’s HHI value.100 But if the errors involve larger 
firms, the HHI calculation for the industry can produce large 
errors.101 This argument overstates the problem, since the 
Guidelines look at the change in HHI rather than absolute 
values—other than as a threshold matter. The error would 
presumably appear in both the pre- and post-merger 
calculations, resulting in a de minimis distortion to the 
increase in HHI. Moreover, any index of concentration will 
suffer from measurement bias, and the HHI does not suffer 
more in this regard than others. 
Finally, the charge has been made that by lumping post-
merger HHI into one of three regions, the DOJ does not treat 
 
97. William F. Baxter, A Justice Department Perspective, 51 
ANTITRUST L.J. 287, 292 (1982). 
98. See Calkins, supra note 47, at 425. 
99. See Steven C. Salop, Symposium on Mergers and Antitrust, 1 
J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 10 (1987). 
100. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 4, at 157-62. 
101. See Calkins, supra note 47, at 405. 
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all mergers equally.102 Prior to the 2010 revisions, substantial 
arbitrariness was possible. Given two mergers, one with a 
higher HHI change could have passed muster under the former 
Guidelines while the merger with a lesser change in HHI 
triggered the presumption of anticompetitiveness.103 Consider 
the two hypothetical industries given in Figure 4. In industry 
A, a merger between the firms with market shares of 2% and 
13% presumptively would have been anticompetitive under the 
former Guidelines, whereas in industry B, the firm with a 2% 
share could have merged with the firm having a 24% share 
without any concern of antitrust action. Both mergers result in 
an industry HHI of close to 1,800, and the merger sanctioned 
by the Guidelines would raise HHI by nearly twice that of the 
merger that was presumed anticompetitive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
102. See George G. Szpiro, A Note on the Equitable Treatment of 
Mergers, 13 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 543 (1992). Szpiro 
misunderstands the Merger Guidelines to focus on pre-merger HHI, 
and offers no justification for his choice of just two of the potentially 
infinite data points from which to extrapolate a linear relationship 
between pre-merger HHI and the maximum permissible increase in 
HHI. 
103. See id. This disparity was possible because, under the 
former Merger Guidelines, if a merger resulted in a moderately 
concentrated industry, the HHI had to increase by more than 100 
points before anticompetitive concerns were triggered. If the 
resultant industry was highly concentrated, however, the HHI had to 
increase by only 51 points to create a presumption of enhanced 
market power. Under the current Guidelines, no merger raises 
concerns if the HHI change does not exceed 100 points. Compare 2010 
Merger Guidelines, supra note 81, with 1997 Merger Guidelines, 
supra note 50. 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/8
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Figure 4.  
 
 
The 2010 revisions to the Merger Guidelines fixed this 
problem by changing the HHI differentials necessary to trigger 
anticompetitive concerns.104 In any event, this type of criticism 
ignores both the letter and the spirit of the Guidelines. As 
discussed above, the merger regulators’ analyses do not turn on 
such technical minutiae.105 Not surprisingly, most of the 
practical criticisms of the HHI arose around the time the DOJ 
adopted the 1982 Merger Guidelines. In the three decades 
since, these arguments have clearly proven unfounded. The 
theoretical criticisms offer more substance. 
 
2. Criticisms of the HHI in Theory 
 
The most common theoretical attacks on the HHI center on 
its weightings of the number of firms, n, versus their size 
distribution, v. For instance, some commentators have 
suggested that the HHI overstates the potential competitive 
impact of mergers involving large and small firms (i.e., n is 
overemphasized relative to v).106 Unless a small firm “is a 
‘maverick’ or has substantial excess capacity and competitive 
 
104. Compare 1997 Merger Guidelines, supra note 50, with 2010 
Merger Guidelines, supra note 81. 
105. See supra p. 121. 
106. See Scheffman et al., supra note 77, at 283. 
 Market Share 
 Industry A Industry B 
Firm 1 27% 24% 
Firm 2 17% 17% 
Firm 3 14% 17% 
Firm 4 14% 16% 
Firm 5 13% 12% 
Firm 6 13% 12% 
Firm 7 2% 2% 
 
Pre-merger HHI 1,752 1,702 
Post-merger HHI 1,804 1,798 
Change 52 96 
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costs[,]” its acquisition by a larger competitor should not raise 
the concerns an HHI analysis might indicate.107 
In the opposite vein, others have claimed that the HHI 
understates the value of small competitors (i.e., v is 
overemphasized relative to n).108 For example, if an industry 
has a dominant firm with market share s1 and (n – 1) smaller, 
equally sized firms, then the limit of the HHI is   
  as    . If 
the dominant firm merges with one of the smaller firms, the 
market’s HHI necessarily will increase. Previously, the 
Guidelines held that any increase in HHI raised competitive 
concerns if the post-merger HHI resulted in a concentrated 
market. The problem was that if the dominant firm’s pre-
merger market share were sufficiently large (under the 
previous Guidelines, when s1>41%), the merger would raise 
competitive concerns no matter how many additional firms 
occupied the market. A superior index, the argument goes, 
would not cap the effect of additional firms, no matter how 
small.109 In other words, as the number of firms in a market 
approaches infinity, the concentration index should approach 
zero, no matter what the size distribution.110 
The most recent Guidelines respond to this criticism by 
imposing a 100-point buffer before scrutiny is triggered, even in 
highly concentrated markets, because HHI increases of less 
than 100 points “are unlikely to have adverse competitive 
effects.”111 While the HHI does not approach zero as the 
number of competitors becomes sufficiently large, the number 
of competitors may now make a difference in whether the 
regulators investigate a merger in a concentrated market. If a 
dominant firm merges with one of its small but equally sized 
competitors, HHI will never increase by more than 100 points—
no matter how large the dominant firm—if the firm has more 
than 50 pre-merger competitors.112 
 
107. Id. 
108. See Finkelstein & Friedberg, supra note 17. 
109. See id. 
110. George Stigler has described such a measure as “stimulating 
and appealing” although “it lacks any precise theoretical rationale.” 
George J. Stigler, Comment, 76 YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1967). 
111. 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 81, at 19. 
112. For the HHI to increase by 100 points or more,  
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/8
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Another theoretical criticism of the HHI points out its 
inability to assess dynamic aspects of competition.113 The HHI 
provides a snapshot of the “before” and “after” images of 
market structure. But in the wake of a merger, sufficiently 
large price increases may draw in other competitors, 
deconcentrating the market. In the alternative, the presence of 
potential entrants may restrain significant price increases 
altogether. Dynamic models of concentration would recognize 
that “cost savings are generally longer lived than 
anticompetitive effects” and apply some sort of intertemporal 
discount factor to the effects of increased concentration.114 
However, such models make more sense when weighing the 
costs and benefits of a merger in an efficiencies context—after 
the HHI threshold has been reached.115 
A final criticism of the HHI argues that as a structural 
measure applied uniformly across industries, it misses the 
industry-specific nuances relating structure to market power 
and thus wholly fails to provide regulators with useful 
information. For example, HHI provides no information about 
barriers to entry, economies of scale or scope, rapidly changing 
technology, or firm-specific characteristics, all of which may 
bear on the degree of competition in the industry.116 I will make 
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)       
or   
  (      )
  
  . The maximum value of n required to satisfy this 
inequality is 51, which occurs when      . The 100-point buffer 
produces interesting outcomes in near-monopoly markets. If the 
dominant firm has a 99% market share and two other firms equally 
split the remaining 1% of the market, then a merger between the 
dominant firm and one of the other two firms will raise the HHI by 
only 99 points—ordinarily an insufficient amount to trigger scrutiny. 
113. See Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers: An 
Equilibrium Analysis, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 107 (1990) (arguing that 
market shares among both merging and non-merging firms will 
change, necessitating an analysis of post-merger equilibrium to 
determine the welfare effects). 
114. See Scheffman et al., supra note 77, at 314. 
115. See id. 
116. See Geraldine Alpert, Is Structure All?, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 
255 (1984). 
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a similar argument in the next section with respect to HHI’s 
failure to account for network effects. 
In fairness, attacking the HHI for failing to address every 
individual industry peculiarity somewhat misses the point of 
the index. The HHI offers a general framework for 
approximating competitive effects. It acts as a gatekeeper in 
ruling out cases in which consolidation presents no obvious 
harm to consumers. In this respect, it may prove 
underinclusive—committing the Type II error of allowing 
undesirable mergers to go through. But if the HHI does raise a 
red flag, the Merger Guidelines have alternative provisions to 
address some of the characteristics that might make an 
industry unique. For example, regulators consider barriers to 
entry when determining the relevant market (a prerequisite to 
applying the HHI), in that they affect the ability of firms to 
effectuate a “small but significant and non-transitory increase 
in price.”117 Economies of scale and scope should also receive 
consideration when the government considers efficiencies that 
would offset market power. 
The HHI probably does provide the best general measure 
of industrial concentration, and the Merger Guidelines have 
the flexibility to apply it usefully in a variety of industry 
settings. Discarding the HHI because it does not perfectly 
forecast market power in every application would be senseless. 
At the same time, when it becomes apparent that particular 
types of industries do not fit well into the HHI mold for some 
critical reason, the Guidelines can and should be adjusted to 
account for that. I turn to such an argument now. 
 
B. Criticism of the HHI As Applied to Network Industries 
 
Networks contain nodes connected by links.118 
Structurally, a network can take many forms. One common 
 
117. 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 52, at 9. 
118. See generally LAWRENCE J. WHITE, U.S. PUBLIC POLICY 
TOWARD NETWORK INDUSTRIES (1999) (offering a thorough overview of 
network industry economics and the attendant policy issues); 
Nicholas Economides, The Economics of Networks, 14 J. INT’L J. 
INDUS. ORG. 673, 674 (1996) (providing another excellent discussion of 
network industry economics). 
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arrangement, called a star or hub-and-spoke network, involves 
one or more common nodes (or “hubs”) connected uniquely to 
many other nodes (or “spokes”).119 This form of network occurs, 
for instance, in the communications and airline industries. 
However, various topographical forms of networks exist in 
many diverse industries, and the term as used here in an 
economics context should be distinguished from its colloquial 
reference to specific products, such as hardware and 
software.120 
The fundamental characteristic of a network industry is 
“positive consumption and production externalities.”121 These 
externalities occur when “the value of a unit of the good 
increases with the expected number of units to be sold.”122 In 
other words, users of a network good or service derive value 
both from the good or service itself and also from the direct or 
indirect effects of additional users. Computer operating 
systems offer a classic example: consumers benefit from the 
functionality that an operating system provides. Additionally, 
when they purchase a popular operating system, consumers 
benefit from not having to learn other platforms on computers 
outside the home (a direct benefit) and from having a wide 
variety of applications to choose from (an indirect benefit). 
Positive consumption externalities not surprisingly have 
an impact on demand. As the expected number of users of a 
network commodity increases, so does the price a given number 
of potential users will pay—i.e., the demand curve itself shifts 
up, although it remains downward sloping.123 As an 
illustration, consider a hypothetical single-firm network 
industry in which a finite number of potential consumers have 
a willingness to pay that is uniformly distributed between 0 
and a when everyone uses the network. That is, the number of 
potential customers equals the number of actual customers at a 
 
119. See Economides, supra note 118, at 675. 
120. See Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Antitrust Enforcement in Dynamic 
Network Industries, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 859, 861 (1998). 
121. Economides, supra note 118, at 678. 
122. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
123. See id. 
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price of zero.124 This implies the familiar linear demand curve. 
In accordance with the positive consumption externality, each 
potential customer discounts her willingness to pay by  , the 
ratio of actual to potential customers, which is equivalent to 
the share of the market served by the firm.125 In equilibrium, 
    (   ) where P is the price charged.126 Figure 5 depicts 
this relationship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
124. This example is adapted from Jeffrey Rohlfs, A Theory of 
Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service, 5 BELL J. 
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 16 (1974). 
125. Of course there is no reason other than ease of exposition to 
assume a linear relationship between δ and willingness to pay. It may 
well be the case that there is a critical mass of δ somewhere between 
0 and 1, before which there is an increasing marginal willingness to 
pay and beyond which a decreasing marginal willingness to pay. 
126. As a proof, let x denote the large but finite number of 
potential customers, and Q the number of actual customers. Given 
the uniform willingness to pay, Q = x(1 – P/a) or P = a(1 – Q/x) = a(1 – 
 ) when   = 1. Given that each potential customer discounts her 
willingness to pay by  , the inverse demand curve becomes   
  (   ) for    [0, 1]. For an elaboration, see PEPALL ET AL., supra 
note 29, at 615-20. 
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Figure 5.  
 
 
At any positive price greater than or equal to marginal cost 
c and less than a/4, two potential equilibria exist. For instance, 
at both points A and B, demand equals supply, the additional 
demand at B stemming from the additional value that the 
greater number of network users generates. At D the number 
of network users creates value exceeding that reflected in the 
price, and additional consumers (those with lower willingness 
to pay at any network size) will want to join the network. In 
equilibrium, D will shift to D’. 
Thus, the upward sloping side of the demand curve 
represents a “critical mass.”127 At points to the left of this 
curve, the price is too high to sustain the number of users. 
Those with the lowest willingness to pay will drop out of the 
 
127. See Rohlfs, supra note 124, at 29. 
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market.128 But the reduced number of users diminishes the 
value of the network to the remaining users, and more drop 
out. The effect snowballs until no users remain and the 
network fails. To the right of the critical mass the opposite 
effect takes hold, as illustrated by the move from D to D’. The 
critical mass curve itself represents a set of unstable 
equilibria.129 Outcomes along the curve remain tenable only so 
long as no exogenous forces perturb the steady state. 
It is important to distinguish network industries from 
natural monopolies. Industries of both types have a tendency 
towards consolidation, albeit for different reasons. Natural 
monopolies possess increasing returns to scale, meaning that 
as they increase output their average costs decrease. Typically, 
this occurs when a firm incurs high fixed costs and low 
marginal costs. Larger firms will thus maintain cost 
advantages over smaller firms and in the long term the 
industry becomes a small oligopoly or monopoly in the absence 
of government intervention. 
By contrast, network industries tend towards monopoly 
not because of increasing returns to scale—although they often 
exhibit that trait—but because, all else equal, consumers 
derive greater utility purchasing from firms with more 
customers. Even in a network industry with decreasing returns 
to scale (i.e., where average unit costs increase with output), 
consumers will purchase a more expensive product if a 
sufficiently large number of other consumers use it. 
For example, an electric power company has high startup 
costs but relatively low marginal costs—once the expensive 
infrastructure is in place, it costs virtually nothing to add an 
additional user and its marginal cost is essentially the cost of 
electricity production. At the same time, there are no direct 
benefits and few indirect benefits to one user of adding 
additional users. The electric power industry would therefore 
be classified as a natural monopoly but not a network industry. 
 
128. This raises the question of how a network firm reaches its 
critical mass in the first place without the help of a subsidy or below-
cost pricing, an issue beyond the scope of this discussion. 
129. See Rohlfs, supra note 124, at 29. 
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The telecommunications industry is classified as a natural 
monopoly for reasons similar to the electric power industry. 
Telecommunications also qualifies as a network industry 
because there are direct and indirect benefits to one user as the 
number of other users increase. 
The apparel industry serves as an example of a network 
industry that is not a natural monopoly. Fixed costs are low 
relative to variable costs, most costs increase at least 
proportionally with output, and no appreciable economies of 
scale exist.130 On the other hand, as more and more individuals 
don a particular brand of clothing, it becomes increasingly 
fashionable and other consumers’ willingness to pay for it 
increases.131 
This distinction between industries with network effects 
and natural monopoly industries is important for policy 
reasons. The government typically protects consumers from a 
natural monopoly by allowing the monopoly but strictly 
regulating prices, profits, or both.132 No such rationale supports 
the imposition of similarly draconian measures on network 
industries that do not exhibit natural monopoly tendencies; 
consumers may in fact benefit from the concentration even in 
the presence of higher prices. 
The use of the HHI in horizontal merger regulation 
presumes that consumer welfare suffers as firms increase their 
market share and take advantage of the consequent increase in 
market power to raise prices. In network industries, the 
validity of this presumption comes into question. Consumer 
 
130. See Yoram Gutgeld & Damon Beyer, Are You Going Out of 
Fashion?, 3 MCKINSEY Q. 55, 58 (1995). 
131. But only to a point there are also negative network effects 
that eventually outweigh the positive ones associated with more 
users. On the one hand, an increasing number of users reassures 
consumers that the garment has value. On the other hand, as an 
article of clothing becomes more ubiquitous each wearer feels less 
unique and the brand value becomes diluted. See Peter M. Kort et al., 
Brand Image and Brand Dilution in the Fashion Industry, 42 
AUTOMATICA 1363 (2006). 
132. See generally LUÍS M.B. CABRAL, INTRODUCTION TO 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 75-77 (2000). 
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surplus—the traditional measure of consumer welfare—is the 
difference between the amount consumers actually pay for a 
product and the aggregate amount they would be willing to pay 
for the product.133 Consumer surplus should fall when the post-
merger price rises because of enhanced market power—the 
competitive effect.134 Conversely, consumers will pay more for a 
product with positive consumption externalities following a 
merger that expands the network size. This increased 
willingness to pay tends to increase consumer surplus—the 
network effect.135 
On balance then, it remains uncertain whether a network 
industry merger will increase or decrease consumer surplus. 
The result depends on which effect dominates: the competitive 
or the network effect. The next section explores an economic 
model of this relationship and examines situations in which the 
benefits from the network effect outweigh the losses to 
consumers from lessened competition. The model takes as its 
starting point the basic Cournot model of competition, with its 
direct link to the HHI.136 
 
IV. A Model of Competition in Network Industries 
 
A. The Basic Model of Network Industry Competition 
 
In the basic model n > 1 firms face x > 0 consumers, where 
x is assumed to be a sufficiently large number. Willingness to 
pay is distributed uniformly among consumers on [0, a]. Thus, 
firms face a linear demand function at a given level of output. 
 
133. See, e.g., WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: 
BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 145-47, 317-18 (9th ed. 2005). In 
general, different consumers would be willing to pay different 
amounts for the same product. It is this phenomenon that gives rise 
to the downward slope of the demand curve. At any given price, 
different consumers will realize different surpluses. Consumer 
surplus for a market is the sum of surpluses across all consumers 
whose willingness to pay equals or exceeds the price charged. 
134. See Economides, supra note 118, at 691. 
135. See id. 
136. See supra pp. 115-116. 
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The importance of the latter limitation will be explained 
shortly. 
Firms compete à la Cournot in that each firm   {         } 
simultaneously selects its output, qj, taking into account the 
demand function and the industry cost function. Each firm 
incurs zero fixed costs and a constant marginal cost of cj = c. 
Because costs must be positive and less than the amount at 
least one person is willing to pay, c is confined to the interval 
(0, a). 
Consumers’ willingness to pay also depends on the 
network size of the firm from which they make their purchase. 
Accordingly, the demand function D that a particular firm faces 
is discounted by the fraction of the market that firm captures, 
   
  
 
. In other words,     (      )     where pj is the price 
charged by firm j and     ∑      
 
   . This departs from the 
Cournot model in that firms do not necessarily sell the good at 
the same price in equilibrium. Larger firms—those with 
greater output—will charge a higher price for their product. 
Nonetheless, the undiscounted prices must be equal regardless 
of output to avoid arbitrage, i.e.,   
           
    . 
Accordingly, the undiscounted market demand function is 
   (  
  
 
) 
and the inverse demand function is  
    (  
 
 
) 
where   ∑   
 
   . Firm j will then charge     (  
 
 
)   , yielding 
the profit function 
   [ (  
 
 
)     ]    
In equilibrium,137 each firm will maximize profits when 
 
137. Because the profit function is a third degree polynomial with 
respect to qj, the first order conditions capture both relative maxima 
and minima. The additional constraints implemented below will 
eliminate the solutions involving relative minima. 
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Solving the above system of n first order conditions yields 
solutions of the form   
  {     } where i firms will optimize at 
   and (n – i) firms will optimize at            . This follows 
from the fact that the n first order conditions are symmetrical 
quadratics. Thus, there will be (  ) solutions for each value of i 
and a total of    unconstrained solutions. 
To obtain values for    and   , the system of x first order 
conditions can be reduced to 
{
    
      [(   )   (   )    ]    
   
    
      [    (     )    ]    
   
 
which has the solution 
{
 
 
 
   
   [
  √ [   (    )(       )]
 (    )
]
  
   [
  √ [   (    )(       )]
 (       )
]
 
Additionally, there may be corner solutions in which      is 
an optimal response to some      and vice versa.138 
In order for the solutions to make economic sense, they 
must conform to the constraints set forth above as well as the 
requirement that both output and profits are positive for all 
firms: 
{
  
   
  
   
   
 or 
{
 
 
 
 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
     
 or {
  
   
  
   
   
 
except for corner solutions where 
 
138. Both interior and corner solutions are Nash equilibria. That 
is, each firm produces at the most profitable level given the 
production decisions of every other firm, leaving no firm with an 
incentive to deviate from its equilibrium output. 
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{
(  
      
   )     
      {         }   
   
 
or  
{
(  
      
   )     
      {         }   
   
 
and 0 < i < n. 
It turns out that the only valid interior solutions occur 
when i = n (all firms produce at   
 ) and   
 
 
 
 
(   ) 
. There 
also exist corner solutions where g firms choose to produce at 
   
 (  √ (   (    )))
 (    )
 and (n – g) firms choose not to produce 
when 
   √ 
(     √ )
  
 
 
 
 
(   ) 
. 
The different restrictions on values of 
 
 
 for interior and 
corner solutions has important economic implications. The 
term 
 
 
 can be thought of as the industry cost structure, as it 
represents the industry marginal cost relative to the maximum 
amount anyone would pay for the product. It falls on the range 
(0, 1), which can be divided into four distinct regions. 
At sufficiently low industry cost structures, only interior 
solutions are possible or, put differently, all firms will choose to 
produce. From an economic interpretation, even if all g < n of 
the producing firms in a potential corner solution could 
credibly threaten to set their output as if the other (n – g) firms 
had left the market, the other firms would still find it 
profitable to enter as a result of sufficiently low costs. This in 
turn would induce the g firms to reduce their actual from their 
threatened output until the entire industry wound up at the 
interior equilibrium. 
When industry costs exceed a certain level, a credible 
threat by g firms to set output at the g-firm oligopoly level will 
deter the remaining firms from entry. No positive amount of 
production by those (n – g) firms will yield positive profits for 
them, resulting in corner solutions. At the same time, an 
interior equilibrium in which all firms set output equal to   
  
remains feasible. 
As the cost structure continues to rise, at some point the 
viability of interior solutions will end while at least some 
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corner solutions will continue to be possible. The number of 
firms a given cost structure can support will decrease as the 
cost structure increases until only one firm can profitably 
produce. As the cost structure increases, firms can only recoup 
their greater costs by charging a higher price, which in turn 
can only be supported by a sufficiently large network. When 
the cost structure exceeds a certain point, 
 
 
 
 
 
, not even a 
monopoly firm can make a profit and the only possible outcome 
will be for all firms to shut down. 
 Figure 6 illustrates these regions and the corresponding 
shares of the total market served as well as consumer surplus 
for the simple case where n = 2. To borrow a physics analogy, 
Figure 6 resembles a critical phase transition: over a certain 
range, either of two potential outcomes may occur, the actual 
one reached a result of path-dependence.139 Left to the invisible 
hand, the market could settle at the socially inferior outcome, 
however defined.140 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
139. See generally PHILIP BALL, CRITICAL MASS: HOW ONE THING 
LEADS TO ANOTHER (2004) (discussing how phase transitions, path-
dependence, and other concepts from the field of physics relate to 
social science phenomena, including economic and legal applications). 
140. Cf. Rubinfeld, supra note 120, at 862-63 (describing a Pareto 
inferior outcome in which market forces cause a dominant network 
firm to drive a rival with superior technology out of the market 
because of incompatible standards). Often when two firms occupy the 
market, they will compete fiercely and the equilibrium can shift 
suddenly and dramatically, a phenomenon known as “tipping.” See id. 
at 865-66. 
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Figure 6. 
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By comparison, the traditional n-firm Cournot model 
would not permit corner solutions. As long as all firms face the 
same constant marginal cost, it follows that if one firm finds it 
profitable to produce then all firms will find it profitable. In 
this model of network industry competition, nonproducing 
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firms could be thought of as potential entrants that become 
actual entrants if the costs structure is permissively low. 
 
B. Accounting for Residual Value 
 
One deficiency in the model thus far presented is that it 
fails to account for residual value—that is, it treats a product 
produced by a network with zero users as worthless, having no 
intrinsic value apart from its network benefits. This extreme 
assumption rarely if ever holds true in the real world. As an 
illustration, consider a word processing program. It qualifies as 
a network product because its value to each user increases with 
the total number of users. However, even if no one uses the 
program, it may still offer value to a potential purchaser in 
that it performs a useful function. 
Residual value will vary considerably from product to 
product. For example, an airline network will offer a very high 
residual value to customers. Although passengers no doubt 
appreciate some benefits of a larger network,141 their 
immediate concern is to travel on a particular itinerary. 
Depending on their elasticity of demand, air travelers will 
sacrifice the conveniences of a larger network to some degree 
for a lower fare. Furthermore, negative network externalities 
may offset the positive ones, to which anyone who has ever 
been trapped in a middle seat on a crowded flight can attest. 
Computer operating systems offer a moderate degree of 
residual value. Although the products offer functionality 
regardless of network size, the number of other users of a 
particular piece of software is an important consideration. 
Learning to operate multiple software programs where one 
would suffice results in a costly waste of time. 
At the other end of the spectrum, credit cards typically 
offer very little residual value to users. A credit card accepted 
by only one vendor provides extremely limited utility to 
consumers. Although such cards do exist, vendors must usually 
 
141. Most of these network benefits are indirect, such as 
frequency of flights, fewer connections, nearby alternative airports in 
case of service disruptions, better frequent flyer reward programs, 
etc. 
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dispense them for free or even with compensation for their use, 
i.e., at a negative price. Retailers typically offer a discount on 
the first purchase made with their store credit card as an 
incentive to acquire it. In contrast, large credit card networks 
like MasterCard and Visa frequently impose an annual fee and 
high annual percentage rate on their card members, who 
willingly incur these costs because of the widespread 
acceptance of the cards. 
Because residual value is a factor of variable importance to 
demand for network products, it is desirable to capture this 
effect in the model and to examine its effects. Let   denote a 
product’s residual value, which can take values on the range [0, 
1). In this more robust model, 
     
  
 
(   ) 
In the case where   = 1, no network effects are present and the 
model collapses into the garden variety Cournot setup. When   
= 0, the product has no residual value, exactly as in the basic 
model presented above. 
Similar to the basic model, interior equilibrium solutions 
are characterized by i firms producing at    and (n – i) firms 
producing at    such that in equilibrium 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
(
 
 (   (      ))  √  ( (   )   )  (     4  (   ))(    )(       )
  (    )(   )
)
 
  
   
(
 
 (   (      ))  √  ( (   )   )  (     4  (   ))(    )(       )
  (       )(   )
)
 
 
Unlike in the basic model, valid interior equilibria can exist, 
subject to certain constraints,142 for values of i greater than 
zero and less than or equal to n. In other words, this more 
robust model has the potential for more interior solutions than 
the basic model. It also allows for corner solutions. 
For example, a two-firm industry could reach one of five 
different equilibria under certain parameter values. Figure 7 
illustrates this for the case when 
 
 
     and   = .28. 
 
 
142. These constraints are set forth in the Appendix. 
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Figure 7 
 
There are three interior solutions. At point C, each firm sells to 
approximately 28.4% of the potential market, x. At point D, 
firm 1 sells to approximately 44.1% of the potential market and 
firm 2 sells to 9.6%. Point B is the reverse of point D. Point C is 
not Pareto superior to either B or D—one firm will realize a 
greater profit and one a lesser profit than when their output is 
unequal. 
Additionally, there are two corner solutions, points A and 
E, where one firm produces at the monopoly level, selling to 
approximately 51.5% of the potential market, and the other 
firm chooses not to produce. The non-producing firm cannot 
make a profit at any positive level of output given the 
producing firm’s output choice. 
For the purposes of the next section—evaluating the effect 
of mergers on consumer welfare—it is helpful to limit the 
number of potential equilibria. For that reason, it will be 
assumed that in the initial state all firms set output 
identically, equal to    and corresponding to point C above. 
Firm 1’s best response 
Firm 2’s best response 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
𝑞  
𝑞  
𝜋    
𝜋    
𝜋  𝜋    
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This has the advantage of requiring the fewest restrictions on 
parameter values. In particular, it is the only possible interior 
equilibrium when 
 
 
    . 
 
C. The Effect of Mergers on Consumer Welfare 
 
The best way to evaluate the welfare of consumers under 
given market conditions is to measure the surplus S that they 
realize.143 This model allows for two different prices 
concurrently in equilibrium, owing to the different discounts 
consumers apply to their willingness to pay for networks of 
unequal size. To evaluate consumer surplus, I calculate the 
aggregate consumer surplus at undiscounted prices and apply 
the discount for each network size in proportion to each 
network’s share of the total output. In other words, 
  ∫    (  )  (  
   
 
   
  (   )  
    
(   )  
 
   
  (   )  
 )
      
       
 
or 
   
 
   
[(   
  (   )  
 )(   
 (   (   )  
 )  (   )  
 (   (   )  
 ))] [1] 
As discussed in the preceding section, this Article will 
investigate only equilibrium solutions where all firms produce 
  
  units of output. Equation [1] can then be simplified by 
setting i equal to n, yielding 
   
 
   
(   
 ) (   (   )  
 ) [2] 
The expanded equation will still prove useful for evaluating 
consumer surplus in the short term. 
The model thus far presented predicts the outcome of 
competition in network industries for a given number of firms 
facing a given cost structure. It provides an illustration of the 
competitive landscape in the steady state that precedes a 
merger, but offers little insight as to the market structure that 
results following a merger. This Article will consider two 
simple cases of the post-merger structure—one short term and 
one long term. These two cases present two extremes of the 
possible structural outcomes of a merger. 
 
143. See supra pp. 133-34. 
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In the immediate aftermath of a merger, the overall 
production in the market remains substantially the same, the 
major difference being that one larger firm produces the 
amount of output previously contributed by two smaller firms. 
The Merger Guidelines take essentially a short run view in 
their application of the HHI.144 In the long run, the merged 
firm will likely cut back on production to some extent, 
depending on demand elasticities. Other firms in the industry 
may increase their output.145 In the most sanguine of worlds 
(from the consumer’s standpoint), the remaining firms will 
eventually end up once more with roughly equal market 
shares. 
Accordingly, the short run case assumes that one merged 
firm produces output equal to    
  while the remaining (n – 2) 
firms continue to produce output equal to   
 . The long run case 
assumes that after the merger all (n – 1) firms produce at    
  
where          . In both cases, the pre-merger consumer 
surplus is exactly the amount from equation [2]. 
For the short run case, we can utilize equation [1], letting 
  
     
 . The post-merger consumer surplus therefore is 
    
 
   
[ (  
 ) (    (   )(   )  
 )] [3] 
Subtracting [2] from [3] yields the quantity 
 
144. In considering the change in HHI the Guidelines assume 
static market shares follow the merger and do not incorporate a 
dynamic equilibrium analysis. See supra p. 114 and note 50. 
145. For empirical evidence, see John R. Baldwin & Paul K. 
Gorecki, Mergers Placed in the Context of Firm Turnover, in 5 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL RESEARCH 
CONFERENCE 53 (1990) (finding significant declines in market shares 
for plants acquired in horizontal mergers); Klaus Gugler et al., The 
Effects of Mergers: An International Comparison, 21 INT’L J. INDUS. 
ORG. 625 (2003) (considering international data and finding 
consistently reduced sales among merging firms); Dennis C. Mueller, 
Mergers and Market Share, 67 REV. ECON. & STAT. 259 (1985) 
(conducting large-scale study that found merging firms lost market 
share relative to non-merging firms); Martin Pesendorfer, Horizontal 
Mergers in the Paper Industry, 34 RAND J. ECON. 495 (2003) (finding 
that 74.1% of merging firms lost market share). 
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[ (  
 ) (   )] [4] 
which is always positive. Therefore, in the short run case post-
merger consumer surplus will always exceed pre-merger 
surplus by the amount in equation [4] when two identically 
sized network firms combine. 
The long run case offers similar but more qualified results. 
For most cost structures, consumer surplus will increase after 
a network industry merger, given a sufficiently low residual 
value. Figure 8 provides an illustration. 
 
Figure 8.  
 
  
n = 2 n = 100 
(a) (b) 
 
The shaded areas represent feasible parameter combinations 
(i.e., those that produce profitable outcomes before and after 
the merger). The darker regions indicate parameter values for 
which the post-merger consumer surplus exceeds the pre-
merger surplus. 
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This is not to say that mergers involving products with 
sufficiently low residual value will evince unequivocally good 
results; merely that such mergers will result in increased 
consumer surplus. There may of course be important 
considerations other than immediate welfare maximization, as 
will be discussed in the next part. 
Regardless of the relative merits of welfare maximization 
versus other objectives, the long-term equilibrium case 
highlights the importance of proper merger evaluation by 
regulators. Although in many circumstances network industry 
mergers will increase consumer surplus, in many other 
circumstances such mergers will not be desirable from a public 
policy perspective. 
 
V. A Suggested Approach for Incorporating Network Effects 
into Merger Evaluation 
 
The usefulness of HHI analysis varies with the degree to 
which an industry exhibits network externalities. Prior to their 
HHI analysis but subsequent to market definition, antitrust 
regulators should attempt to determine the residual value of 
the relevant products. In terms of the model above, regulators 
should attempt to estimate  . The greater the residual value, 
the less impact network externalities will have on post-merger 
consumer welfare. 
 Figure 8 also suggests a second consideration: cost. All 
else equal, a network industry with a greater marginal cost 
structure is more likely to experience an increase in consumer 
welfare from consolidation. When the number of firms in a 
network industry decreases, the industry output decreases, the 
price increases and the output per firm increases. The first two 
of these phenomena tend to decrease consumer surplus while 
the third tends to increase it, making the overall change in 
surplus uncertain. However, as the cost structure increases, 
the proportional increase in output per firm increases whereas 
the proportional decrease in industry output and increase in 
price both diminish in magnitude. As a result, the change in 
consumer surplus from industry consolidation—although not 
necessarily positive for all values of marginal cost—will 
increase with the marginal cost structure. 
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It is important then to understand both the amount of 
residual value attributable to a product and its marginal cost of 
production when evaluating network industry mergers. The 
higher the product’s residual value and the lower its cost, the 
more the industry resembles a “traditional” industry and the 
more insight a subsequent HHI analysis will reveal. On the 
other hand, the HHI will provide scant guidance when 
evaluating mergers involving products with low residual values 
and high marginal costs of production. 
The HHI may still play a useful role in the regulation of 
mergers in which network effects dominate. As acknowledged 
at the outset, increased concentration may influence industry 
behavior in anticompetitive ways other than through the price 
mechanism. For instance, a lack of competition could in theory 
suppress innovation, which would ultimately weigh on 
consumer utility.146 Moreover, as networks grow large, firms 
can attempt to stifle competition by reducing the 
interoperability between their dominant networks and those of 
smaller rivals.147 
Mergers will also have the result of suppressing total 
market output and raising price, similar to the difference 
 
146. See JOHN E. KWOKA, JR. & LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE 
ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY 420-
21 (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION]. 
Empirical evidence in a non-network context suggests otherwise. See 
Richard Blundell et al., Market Share, Market Value and Innovation 
in a Panel of British Manufacturing Firms, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 529 
(1999). 
147. For example, in the U.S. government’s monopolization suit 
against Microsoft, the government alleged, inter alia, that Microsoft 
had leveraged its considerable market power and reduced 
interoperability. For an illuminating discussion of the case and 
network issues involved, see Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Maintenance of 
Monopoly: U.S. v. Microsoft, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION, supra 
note 146, at 476. Preventing network mergers that substantially 
increase concentration may combat such anticompetitive behavior. 
However, given the unstable and rapidly changing competitive 
dynamics in network industries, merger policy alone may not 
adequately guard against such concerns. 
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between the interior and corner solution outcomes illustrated 
in  Figure 6 above. To the extent government policy favors low 
prices and market access over consumer surplus, even mergers 
with substantial network benefits may invite scrutiny. 
For instance, if the network in question involved a 
telecommunications service, a policymaker might wish to 
maximize the number of consumers with access to some 
network, regardless of size. One means of achieving that 
outcome would be to prohibit large telecommunications 
mergers. A more efficient outcome would nonetheless allow 
consolidation; the government could increase network access 
through a subsidy or by creating a legal monopoly that could 
price discriminate, if possible.148 
Although an unconsolidated industry in some sense 
compensates consumers with lower prices, society as a whole 
shoulders the opportunity cost of using smaller, less effective 
networks rather than larger ones with critical mass. The pre-
merger equilibrium often will not capture the bulk of the 
positive network externalities. In any event, the government 
should acknowledge the HHI’s inherent limitations in the 
network context regardless of extent to which it continues to 
rely on the index. 
The DOJ and FTC could address these network issues in a 
variety of ways, ranging from a radical transformation of the 
current horizontal merger evaluation process to a minor 
tweaking of the existing guidelines. On one end of the 
spectrum, the agencies could choose to completely revamp their 
processes and adopt a dynamic model, such as the one 
presented above, which incorporates the concept of residual 
value.149 If such a model indicated a lack of significant network 
effects or, alternatively, if it produced an inconclusive or 
insubstantial prediction of changes in consumer welfare, 
regulators might then use the HHI as a tiebreaker. 
 
148. See PEPALL ET AL., supra note 29, at 620. 
149. See Farrell & Shapiro, supra note 113, at 107-08 (calling for 
a dynamic “equilibrium analysis” rather than the static structural 
model embodied in the HHI, although not specifically addressing the 
issue of network industries or residual value). 
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Residual value, while not commonly calculated at present, 
should not present too difficult a challenge for government 
economists. Standard econometric techniques could easily 
estimate its value for a product made by several different 
competitors. Even in markets with a high degree of 
concentration and thus fewer data points, economists could still 
obtain a reasonable approximation of residual value by 
augmenting the data set with data from other time periods and 
comparable industries. 
The more intractable problem, from an empirical 
perspective, is how to model the discount function. Even if 
regulators could estimate a product’s value both when no one 
uses it and when everyone does, they still need to devise a 
function, which estimates a product’s value for all intermediate 
network sizes. The model above assumed a linear relationship, 
but that may only infrequently hold true. In fact, the function 
may not even be strictly increasing, but may reach a maximum 
and then start to decrease, as in the fashion industry 
example.150 
Given the time and other constraints faced by government 
regulators, such economic modeling may prove impractical. The 
discount function likely will differ substantially from industry 
to industry, necessitating a longer period of time to review 
mergers, reducing transparency and running the risk of 
reaching inconsistent results. Regulators could nonetheless 
incorporate a network effects analysis into their current 
practices. 
Residual value is neither an abstruse concept nor difficult 
to approximate without resort to statistical data. If the 
antitrust authorities examine a merger in which the relevant 
product has a low residual value, they should proceed with 
their HHI analysis knowing it presents only one side of the 
post-merger landscape. Network effects, if not formally 
modeled prior to the HHI analysis, should at a minimum 
receive treatment similar to efficiencies—as an offset to a 
presumptively anticompetitive increase in the HHI score. The 
Merger Guidelines could easily adopt such a change without 
abandoning their existing framework. 
 
150. See supra p. 133. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
Despite the allure of efficiencies and market dominance, 
one wonders why firms would choose to merge in the first 
place, given that mergers frequently prove unprofitable for the 
acquiring company.151 Nonetheless, mergers among network 
firms can bring about substantial consumer benefits, even after 
taking into account the likely price increases from more 
concentrated market power. At the moment, the Merger 
Guidelines give short shrift to such network benefits, and their 
reliance on the HHI lies at the core. 
The HHI serves a useful role in measuring changes in 
industrial concentration. In many industries it provides a 
reasonable initial indication, prior to an efficiencies calculation, 
of harm to consumers from potential consolidation. In network 
industry mergers, however, the presumption of harm from 
concentration obfuscates rather than clarifies the situation. 
The strength of the DOJ and FTC’s approach to the Merger 
Guidelines over the past thirty years has been their willingness 
to modify the Guidelines to better reflect economic realities. 
The beneficial effect of large networks to consumers is well 
documented and our antitrust regulators should 
correspondingly adjust their approach. 
 
151. See Gregor Andrade et al., New Evidence and Perspectives 
on Mergers, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 103 (2001). 
50http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/8
  
944 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:2 
Appendix: Parameter Constraints for Interior Solutions 
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